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Abstract 
 
  
The objective of this paper is to examine whether the threshold beyond 
which public debt may have a detrimental effect on economic growth 
changes across euro area countries during the 1961-2015 period. In contrast 
with previous studies, we do not use panel estimation techniques, but 
implement a time-series analysis for each country based on the growth 
literature. The results suggest that in all the countries but Belgium a debt 
increase begins to have detrimental effects on growth well before the SGP 
debt ceiling (a debt ratio of around 40% and 50% in central and peripheral 
countries, respectively) is reached. So, although austerity policies should be 
applied in EMU countries – since according to our results debt reduction 
barely exerts any significant beneficial impact on EMU countries’ growth – 
they should be accompanied by structural reforms that can increase their 
potential GDP. Moreover, as our results suggest that the harmful impact of 
debt on growth does not occur beyond the same threshold and with the 
same intensity in all EMU countries, a focus on average ratios and impacts 
may be unsuitable for defining policies. Specifically, our findings suggest that 
the pace of fiscal adjustment should be lower in Greece and Spain than in 
the other country. 
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“At the present stage of development in Economics it is probably an advantage to have 
different groups looking at the same problem from different viewpoints, so that their 
conclusions can be compared and possibly then form the basis for a new compressive model”  
Granger (1990, 1) 
 
1. Introduction  
Nine years after the onset of the Great Recession, recovery remains tepid and bumpy in the European 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), and the prospects remain uncertain. The recent economic 
crisis led to an unprecedented increase in public debt across euro area countries1, raising serious 
concerns about its impact after a debt crisis that even called into question the stability of the euro. 
Troubled sovereign borrowers received financial rescue packages which were conditional on fiscal 
austerity and on the implementation of structural reforms to improve competitiveness.  
In the light of the events of the last few years, there is widespread agreement about the potentially 
adverse consequences for the economies of EMU countries of their unparalleled levels of public debt. 
However, few macroeconomic policy debates have generated as much controversy as the current 
austerity argument [see Alesina and Ardagna (2010), Alesina et al. (2015), Guajardo et al. (2011) or Jordà 
and Taylor (2016)] and, as Europe stagnates, the disagreement appears to be far from over. The core of 
the debate revolves around identifying the right stabilization policies to implement or, in a context of 
low economic growth, establishing the right pace of adjustment: austerity measures may prove positive 
in the long run, but they are likely to have negative effects on demand and production during the 
adjustment period [see Cottarelli and Jaramillo (2013), Delong and Summers (2012), or Perotti (2012)].  
Overall, the theoretical literature finds that there is cause to take into account the effects of very high 
debt on capital stock and growth, since it tends to point to a negative link between the public debt-to-
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ratio and the steady-state growth rate of GDP (see, for instance, 
Aizenman et al., 2007). The conventional view is that while debt can stimulate aggregate demand and 
output in the short run [see Barro (1990) or Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999)], in the long run it may 
crowd out capital and reduce output (Salotti and Trecroci, 2016). Moreover, the literature provides a 
variety of reasons to explain why the higher the level of public debt, the more negative its effects. 
Greiner (2014) points out that growth-impeding long-run effects are caused by changes in market 
                                                          
1 On average, public debt reached levels about 100% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) – its highest level in 50 years – by the end of 
2013. 
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participants’ expectations at high levels of public debt, leading to an increase in interest rates and a 
decrease in investment; Teles and Mussolini (2014) stress that, as uncertainty rises, additional fiscal 
flexibility for productive government spending is reduced, with a negative effect on growth; whilst 
Cochrane (2011) emphasizes that the higher the levels of public debt, the greater their negative effects 
due to a climate of uncertainty in which economic actors expect future confiscation, in the form of 
either increasing inflation or distortionary taxation.  
Against this background, we pose the following research questions: What is the threshold beyond 
which debt has a negative impact on euro area economies’ rates of growth? Does the effect of debt on 
economic performance vary across EMU countries? If a heterogeneous nexus between debt and 
growth is found, should the pace of adjustment within euro area countries differ?  
These are important policy questions that need to be answered, but the results from the empirical 
literature in the EMU context do not provide a conclusive response; it has focused mainly on the 
identification of possible non-linearities in the debt-growth relationship and common thresholds 
beyond which debt may have a detrimental effect on growth. Despite the severe sovereign debt crisis, 
few papers have examined the relationship between debt and growth for euro area countries. The 
exceptions, which include Baum et al. (2013), Checherita-Westphal and Rother (2012), Dreger and 
Reimers (2013) and Antonakakis (2014), rest on the results from panel data techniques (obtaining 
average results for EMU countries). However, we argue that more can be learned by using appropriate 
time series analyses for individual countries. 
Therefore, to our knowledge, no strong case has yet been made for analysing the incidence of debt 
accumulation on economic growth and taking into account the particular idiosyncrasies of each euro 
area economy. The study of whether the relationship between public debt and economic growth may 
differ across countries has a significant bearing in the euro area context because, if the impact of debt 
on growth differs according to country, a focus on the average relation may be misleading for the 
definition of policy in individual countries – especially in an environment in which some EMU 
countries are already obliged to apply adjustment plans that re-establish competitiveness and fiscal 
balance. The potential heterogeneity in the debt–growth nexus has indeed been stressed in the literature 
(see Eberhardt and Presbitero, 2015), but no empirical study modelling this relationship using standard 
panel model techniques can claim to be able to study it.  
Hence, this paper aims to fill the existing gap in the literature by explicitly taking into account the 
possible heterogeneity in the relationship between debt and growth across euro area countries. 
Specifically, this paper contributes to the existing literature since, unlike previous studies, we do not 
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make use of panel estimation techniques to combine the power of cross section averaging with all the 
subtleties of temporal dependence; rather, we explore the time series dimension of the issue to obtain 
further evidence based on the historical experience of each country in the sample in order to detect 
potential heterogeneities in the relationship across euro area countries. In so doing, by taking into 
consideration the stationary or non-stationary nature of the variables under study, we can properly use 
hypothesis tests to examine the statistical significance of the estimated coefficients.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the rationale for our empirical 
approach on the basis of the results of some preliminary descriptive analyses. Section 3 provides a 
literature review on the relationship between government debt and growth. Section 4 introduces the 
analytical framework. Section 5 presents the data used in the analysis. Empirical results are presented in 
Section 6 and some extensions are incorporated in order to explore the possibility of asymmetric 
effects and to identify threshold effects. Finally, some concluding remarks and policy implications are 
provided in Section 7. 
2. Preliminary descriptive analysis 
In the following, we provide some descriptive analyses highlighting the cross-country heterogeneity in 
the relationship between debt and growth in euro area countries. Figure 1 shows the evolution of 
sovereign debt-to-GDP and real GDP per capita growth in the 11 countries in our sample (Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) over 
the sample period 1961-2015.  
7 
 
Figure 1. Sovereign Debt-to-GDP and GDP per capita growth evolution in EMU countries: 1961-2015 
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Some interesting insights can be drawn from Figure 1, which shows that the debt-to-GDP ratio 
reached its peak at the end of the sample period in all the countries in our sample, with the exceptions 
of Belgium, Finland, and the Netherlands where the highest ratio coincided with the economic crisis of 
the early 1990s. So, leaving these three countries aside, the recent economic and financial crisis led to 
an unprecedented increase in public debt-to-GDP ratios in the majority of EMU countries, even 
though their evolution over the 1961-2015 period exhibits different patterns. While in Ireland, Italy and 
Spain the notable rise in debt accumulation in 2007-2008 was preceded by a deleverage period; in 
Austria, France, Germany, Greece and Portugal debt presented an upward trend throughout the period, 
albeit at different speeds. With respect to GDP growth, although the evolution of the business cycle is 
quite similar in all EMU countries, the impact of the recessions (five according to the CEPR Euro Area 
Business Cycle Dating Committee2: 1974:Q4-1975:Q1; 1980:Q2-1983:Q3; 1992:Q2-1993:Q3; 2008:Q2-
2009:Q2; and 2011:Q4-2013:Q3) clearly diverges across countries. 
All in all, Figure 1 indicates that the evolution of the two variables studied (public debt-to-GDP and 
GDP per capita growth) presents very different patterns across euro area countries. This suggests that 
an individual analysis of their relationship over time may capture the potential heterogeneity across 
countries and provide more useful information than a country-group analysis applying panel 
techniques.   
Obviously, the above results are by no means conclusive, but they may challenge some of the implicit 
assumptions adopted in most of the previous literature regarding the relationship between debt and 
growth in similar countries, like those in the euro area. They thus provide a good reason to examine 
whether there may be some differences in this relationship across EMU countries depending on their 
level of economic development, their industrial structure, or the institutional environment.  
3. Literature review  
Initially, the empirical evidence on the relationship between debt and growth focused on the role of 
external debt in developing countries [see, for instance, Pattillo et al. (2011) or Presbitero (2012)], while 
analyses across developed countries, particularly in the euro area, were very scarce. However, there are 
some exceptions. Checherita-Westphal and Rother (2012) analyse the empirics of the debt-growth 
nexus using a standard growth model and panel data techniques. They find that, during the 1970-2008 
period, the turning point beyond which government debt negatively affects growth is 90-100% of 
GDP. Baum et al. (2013), who focused on the 1990-2010 period, detected a similar threshold by 
                                                          
2 The CEPR Euro Area Business Cycle Dating Committee establishes the chronology of recessions and expansions of the eleven original 
euro area member countries plus Greece for 1970-1998, and of the euro area as a whole from 1999 onwards (see Centre for Economic 
Policy Research, 2014). 
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employing a dynamic approach (while the short-run impact of debt on per capita GDP growth is 
positive and significant, it decreases to zero beyond debt-to-GDP ratios of 67%, and at ratios above 
95% additional debt has a negative impact on output growth). In contrast, Dreger and Reimers (2013)’s 
analysis is based on the distinction between sustainable and non-sustainable debt periods. Their results 
show that the negative impact of the debt-to-GDP ratio on growth in the euro area is limited to periods 
of non-sustainable public debt; instead, debt will exert a positive impact on growth given that it is 
sustainable. The studies of Checherita-Westphal and Rother (2012), Baum et al. (2013) and Dreger and 
Reimers (2013) are synthesized and extended by Antonakakis (2014). Like them he uses a panel 
approach, but in addition to debt non-linearities he also examines the role of debt sustainability in 
economic growth in the euro area. Overall, the empirical literature mentioned above supports the 
presence of a common debt threshold across (similar) countries like those in the euro area, although 
some recent literature suggests that the presence of a tipping point means that it does not have to be 
common across countries.  
Indeed, the review paper by Panizza and Presbitero (2013) triggered a new wave of studies analysing 
the heterogeneous growth effects of public debt3. According to Mitze and Matz (2015), whilst a “first 
generation” of empirical cross-country studies predominantly predicted an inverted U-shape 
relationship between public debt and economic growth, with a negative impact on growth particularly 
in highly indebted countries, more recently a “second generation” of empirical contributions has 
challenged those findings on various grounds, including uncontrolled sample heterogeneity. The “first 
generation” of papers include the works by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), Pattillo et al. (2011), Lof and 
Malinen (2014) and Woo and Kumar (2015); whilst the “second generation” include Ghosh et al. 
(2013), Markus and Rainer (2016), Chudik et al. (2017), Pescatori et al. (2014) or  Edberhardt and 
Presbitero (2015).  
The latter authors propose a variety of reasons for the heterogeneity across countries in the debt-
growth nexus. Ghosh et al. (2013) show that the turning point may be a function of countries’ structural 
characteristics and GDP growth. Markus and Rainer (2016) point out that, due to specific institutional 
characteristics concerning fiscal flexibility, fiscal effectiveness and fiscal consistency, different economic 
systems entail different degrees of fiscal uncertainty, which to a large extent shape the investment 
                                                          
3 See, e.g., Eberhardt and Presbitero (2015), who investigate the debt-growth relationship in 118 developing, emerging and advanced 
economies and find some evidence for nonlinearity, but state that there is no evidence at all for a common threshold level in all countries 
over time; Égert (2015), who presents empirical evidence suggesting that 90% (the threshold suggested in the seminal paper by Reinhart 
and Rogoff, 2010) is not a magic number since it may be lower and nonlinearity may change across different samples and specifications, 
or Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero (2015), who examine the bi-directional causality between debt and growth in a sample of eleven EMU 
countries and find that public debt has a negative effect over growth from an endogenously determined breakpoint and above a debt 
threshold that differs depending on the country.  
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climate at comparable levels of public debt and thus constitute a source of heterogeneity in the 
relationship between high public debt levels and long-run economic growth. Chudik et al. (2017) and 
Pescatori et al. (2014) identify the debt trajectory as a source of heterogeneity in the debt-growth 
relationship, suggesting that high but falling public debt levels are growth-neutral while high and rising 
debt levels are detrimental for economic activity. Finally, according to Eberhardt and Presbitero (2015), 
there are many possible reasons for the differences in the relationships between public debt and growth 
across countries. First, production technology may differ across countries, and thus also the 
relationship between debt and growth. Second, the capacity to tolerate high levels of debt may depend 
on a number of country-specific characteristics, related to past crises and the macro and institutional 
framework. Third, vulnerability to public debt may depend not only on levels of debt, but also on its 
composition (domestic versus external, foreign or domestic currency-denominated, long-term versus 
short-term public debt), which may also differ significantly across countries. 
Nevertheless, our study of the empirical evidence revealed hardly any analyses of the potential 
heterogeneity in the debt-growth nexus across euro area countries. Thus, to the best of our knowledge, 
this is the first paper to examine explicitly whether the debt-growth relationship may differ across EMU 
countries depending on their particular idiosyncrasies. Our paper, then, is closely related to the work by 
Eberhardt and Presbitero (2015) and covers a very similar period, but it focuses on a different sample 
of countries and applies a different methodology. Whereas those authors used total public debt data 
from 118 developing, emerging and advanced economies, we centre on 11 euro area countries. And 
with regard to the econometric methodology, instead of using panel estimation techniques, we explore 
the time series dimension of the issue to obtain further evidence based on the historical experience of 
each country in the sample and to properly account for the possible heterogeneity in the relationship 
between debt and growth in EMU countries.  
4. Analytical framework 
Economic models are inevitably incomplete characterizations of the complicated reality of economic 
life: “like rays of light they illuminate a part of a whole and leave the rest in dark” Hicks (1981, p.232). 
Therefore, formulating a sufficiently general initial model to capture all the substantively relevant 
influences is a fundamental problem facing all empirical modelling exercises (Doornik and Hendry, 
2015). 
The crucial decision in all empirical studies concerns the set of variables for which observations should 
be collected and then analysed, which will be a small subset of all the variables in the economy. 
Following both the relevant economic theory and the previous empirical results, our empirical strategy 
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incorporates the specification and estimation of a growth equation based on the empirical growth 
literature (e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004) augmented by public debt to assess whether the latter has 
an impact on growth over and above other determinants. 
The initial empirical specification is derived from the neoclassical growth model of Solow, where the 
growth rate of real per capita GDP (gt) for a given country is: 
1
1
n
t t i it t t
i
g y X d    

        (1) 
where yt-1 is the logarithm of initial real per capita GDP (to capture the “catch-up effect” or conditional 
convergence of the economy to its steady state), Xit (i=1, …, n) is a set of explanatory regressors and dt 
is the public debt-to-GDP ratio. 
Regarding Xt, we consider a set of explanatory variables that have been shown to be consistently 
associated with growth in the literature: population growth rate as a percentage (POPGRt); the ratio of 
gross capital formation to GDP (GCFt); life expectancy at birth, a proxy for the level of human capital 
(HKt)4; openness to trade, measured by the absolute sum of exports and imports over GDP (OPENt); 
and the GDP deflator inflation rate, a measure of macroeconomic instability and uncertainty (INFt). 
In the economic growth literature, the rate of growth of labour used in the production process and the 
accumulation of physical capital (investment) are the key determinants of growth (Solow, 1956 or 
Frankel, 1962). So, population growth (POPGRt) and the ratio of gross fixed capital formation to real 
GDP (GCFt) are used to proxy country size and the rate of labour growth and the accumulation of the 
physical capital stock respectively. The empirical evidence suggests that the relationship between 
population and economic growth is mixed and varies between countries. Some empirical studies 
suggest that the relationship is negative and insignificant (Levine and Renelt, 1992); others find a 
negative and significant association (Mankiw et al., 1992); whilst still others present evidence of a 
positive relationship (Sachs and Warner, 1997). The population growth rate, then, has been found to 
exhibit either a positive or a negative relationship with economic growth. However, according to many 
literature reports, a positive and statistically significant impact of physical capital stock (investment) on 
economic growth is expected5.   
                                                          
4 This proxy is also used by Sachs and Warner (1997). Other proxies commonly used for human capital such as years of secondary 
education and school enrollment in secondary were only available from 1980. Additionally, the proxy years of secondary education did not 
change during the sample period. As shown in Jayachandran and Lleras-Muney (2009), longer life expectancy encourages human capital 
accumulation, since a longer time horizon increases the value of investments that pay out over time. Moreover, better health and greater 
education are complementary with longer life expectancy (Becker, 2007). Indeed, life expectancy at birth correlates strongly with the index 
of human capital per person provided by the Penn World Table (version 8.0, Feenstra et al., 2013), based on years of schooling (Barro and 
Lee, 2013) and returns to education (Psacharopoulos, 1994). 
5 Investment and growth may also be associated through the savings ratio (Keynes, 1936). 
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A proxy of human capital (HKt) is included to reflect the notion that countries with an abundance of 
human capital are more likely to be able to attract investors, absorb ideas from the rest of the world, 
and engage in innovation activities (Grossman and Helpman, 1991). Whilst some studies have found a 
positive relationship between human capital and economic growth (Radelet et al., 2001), others have 
found a negative relationship (Barro, 2003). Consequently, the effect of human capital on economic 
growth is expected to be either positive or negative. Trade openness (OPENt) is posited to boost 
productivity through transfers of knowledge and efficiency gains (Seghezza and Baldwin, 2008). Since 
most of the empirical literature [Romer (1992), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), or Edwards (1998), 
among others] provides evidence of the positive impact of openness on growth, a positive sign is 
expected for this variable. Finally, with regard to the inflation rate (INFt), it has been argued that 
inflation is a good macroeconomic indicator of how the government manages the economy [see 
Fischer (1993) or Barro (2003), among other authors] and that low inflation brings about economic 
efficiency because, through the price mechanism, economies are able to allocate scarce resources to 
their best economic use (World Bank, 1990). Nonetheless, the a priori expectation may be either a 
positive or negative association between inflation and economic growth. This uncertain a priori effect is 
supported by the different arguments presented in the literature regarding the relationship between 
these two variables. Whilst some authors defend a negative relationship, others support a positive one. 
So, on the one hand, the former group includes De Gregorio (1993), who suggests that inflation can 
increase the cost of capital, reducing capital accumulation and lowering its productivity and thus 
inhibiting long-run growth; Friedman (1977), who conjectures that inflation uncertainty would reduce 
the effectiveness of the price mechanism to coordinate economic activities, decreasing the output 
growth rate; and Fischer (1993) or Bruno and Easterly (1998), who stress the negative relationship 
between inflation and growth especially via its impact on the efficiency of physical capital. On the other 
hand, the latter group includes Tobin (1965), who argues that higher anticipated inflation can increase 
capital per head as households shift their (portfolio) assets away from real money balances (non-
interest-bearing money) toward real capital (more productive forms) and Dotsey and Sarte (2000), who 
contend that inflation makes the return to money balances uncertain and reduces the demand for real 
money balances and consumption; this increases precautionary savings and, in response to higher 
anticipated inflation, the investment pool enhances economic growth. 
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5. Data  
We use annual data for eleven EMU countries: both central (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany and the Netherlands) and peripheral countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain)6. 
We use long spans of data covering the 1961-2015 period (i.e., a total of 54 annual observations) to 
explore the dimension of historical specificity and to capture the underlying relationship between the 
variables under study. 
To maintain as much homogeneity as possible for a sample of 11 countries over the course of five 
decades, we use the World Bank’s World Development Indicators7 as our primary source. We then 
strengthen our data with the use of supplementary information from the International Monetary Fund 
(International Financial Statistics and World Economic Outlook, October 2016) and the European 
Commission´s AMECO database. As mentioned above, we use per capita GDP at 2010 market prices, 
population growth rate, the ratio of gross capital formation to GDP, an index of human capital, 
openness to trade and GDP deflator inflation. The precise definitions and sources of the variables are 
presented in Appendix 1. 
6. Empirical Results8 
6.1. Time series properties 
Our approach focuses on time series analyses of yearly data for individual countries which can help us 
to document the possible differences in their experiences. This approach is likely to provide an accurate 
idea of what underlies the debt-growth nexus in EMU countries. 
Since the appropriate econometric treatment of a model depends crucially on the pattern of stationarity 
and non-stationarity of the variables under study, before carrying out the estimation we test for the 
order of integration of the variables by means of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests. This step 
is necessary to ensure that all our variables in the regression equation have the same order of 
integration, given the non-stationarity that most macroeconomic data exhibit. The results decisively 
reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity at conventional significance levels for yt, dt, OPENt and 
                                                          
6 This distinction between European central and peripheral countries has been used extensively in the empirical literature. The two groups 
we consider roughly correspond to the distinction made by the European Commission (1995) between countries whose currencies 
continuously participated in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) from its inception and which maintained broadly stable 
bilateral exchange rates with each other over the sample period, and those countries whose currencies either entered the ERM later or 
suspended their participation in the ERM, as well as fluctuating widely in value relative to the Deutschmark. These two groups are also 
roughly the ones found in Jacquemin and Sapir (1996), who applied multivariate analysis techniques to a wide set of structural and 
macroeconomic indicators, to form a homogeneous group of countries. Moreover, these two groups are basically the same as the ones 
found in Ledesma-Rodríguez et al. (2005) according to economic agents’ perceptions of the commitment to maintain the exchange rate 
around a central parity in the ERM, and those identified by Sosvilla-Rivero and Morales-Zumaquero (2012) using cluster analysis when 
analysing the permanent and transitory volatilities of EMU sovereign yields. 
7 http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators 
8 We summarize the results by pointing out the main regularities. The reader is asked to browse through Tables 1 to 5 to find evidence for 
particular country of her/his special interest.  
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HKt (suggesting that these variables can be treated as first-difference stationary, i. e., I(1)), while we do 
not reject the null for gt, INFt, POPGRt and GCFt (indicating that they are stationary in levels, i. e., I(0))
9. 
Then, following Cheung and Chinn’s (1997) suggestion, we confirm these results using the 
Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) (KPSS) tests, where the null is a stationary process against the alternative of a 
unit root10. As can be seen in Figure 1 the growth rates are clearly stationary I(0), whereas dt appears to 
be I(1), highlighting the point made above. 
6.2. Empirical results from the basic empirical model 
Given that our dependent variable is stationary, we cannot explain it with non-stationary variables since 
the presence of an integrated explanatory variable would transmit its non-stationarity to the dependent 
variable. Additionally, if the variables in the regression model are not stationary, then the standard 
assumptions for asymptotic analysis will not be valid and we cannot undertake hypothesis tests about 
the regression parameters. 
Therefore, as a result of the time series properties of our data, the baseline empirical model is as 
follows:  
1 1 2 3 4 5t t t t t t t t tg g INF HK OPEN POPGR GCF d                    (2) 
where Δ denotes the first difference operator.  
Note that model (2) is quite different from model (1), which is commonly used in the literature, 
especially regarding the variables yt-1, HK, OPEN and d, since we find that they are non-stationary and 
therefore enter our model in first differences. As argued in Asimakopoulos and Karavias (2016), by 
rewriting equation (1) as (3) 
1
1 1
l l
s s ns ns
t t i it i it t t
i i
g y X X d     
 
            (3) 
(where s
itX  and 
ns
itX denote the stationary and non-stationary explanatory variables respectively), we 
can compare (3) with our equation (2), which has 1 1t tg y   instead of 1ty  , td  instead of td  and 
ns
itX  instead of 
ns
itX as explanatory variables due to non-stationarity. The interpretation of the 
estimated parameters is the same in both models, but that of , 2 , 3 and  changes. 
We employ a data-based method for obtaining a parsimony representation of the data generating 
process (DGP): the general-to-specific approach (Hendry, 1995). General-to-specific modelling seeks 
                                                          
9 These results (which are not shown here in order to save space, but are available from the authors upon request) were confirmed using 
Phillips-Perron (1998) unit root tests controlling for serial correlation and the Elliott, Rothenberg, and Stock (1996) Point Optimal and 
Ng and Perron (2001) unit root tests for testing non-stationarity against the alternative of high persistence. These additional results are 
also available from the authors. 
10 The results are not shown here due to space restrictions but are available from the authors upon request. 
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to mimic reduction by commencing from a general congruent specification which is simplified to a 
minimal representation consistent with the desired criteria and the data evidence. Starting from a 
general unrestricted model that contains all the variables likely to be relevant (based on the specification 
presented in equation 2) and lags long enough to be able to capture a constant parameter 
representation, standard testing procedures eliminate statistically-insignificant variables. Diagnostic tests 
check the validity of the reductions, ensuring a consistent final selection which produces a 
parsimonious and interpretable econometric model that is data admissible, presents well-behaved 
residuals and uses conditioning variables that are weakly exogenous (see Faust and Whiteman, 1997)11. 
With a judicious choice of parameters and variables this approach generates a well-specified model 
which embeds the economic theory and can deliver the parameters of interest12. 
Given the strong potential for endogeneity of the debt variable, especially reverse causation (low or 
negative growth rates of per-capita GDP are likely to induce higher debt burdens), we use 2-SLS (two-
stage least squares) instrumental variable techniques to estimate the finally selected model. Following 
the common practice with macroeconomic data, we use lagged terms of regressors as instruments. 
Panel A in Table 1 reports the results. It can be observed that all explanatory variables turn out to be 
significant and their signs are in concordance with the literature. The degree of country’s openness to 
trade, both the proxies used to measure human and physical capital and population growth have a 
positive impact on real GDP per capita growth, whilst the inflation rate and the ratio of public debt 
over GDP exert a negative effect13. 
                                                          
11 Phillips (1988) contends that the general-to-specific methodology performs a set of corrections that make it an optimal procedure under 
weak exogeneity. 
12 An impressive record has been built up for the usefulness of empirical model discovery via general-to-specific searches (see Hendry, 
2000). 
13 As pointed out in Section 4.1, a positive effect was expected for the variables measuring openness to trade and physical capital, while a 
negative effect was expected for the ratio of public debt. However, according to the literature the expected effect of human capital, 
population growth and inflation rate might either be positive or negative. 
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Table 1:  Basic empirical model 
Panel A: Estimation results 
  AT BE FI FR GE GR IE IT NL PT SP 
gt-1  
0.3707  
 (3.2602) 
0.1608 
(2.3255) 
 0.1070  
 (2.8211) 
0.4041  
(3.6721) 
0.0413  
 (2.3719) 
0.3687  
(3.0365)  
0.3361  
(2.5325) 
0.4165   
(3.4991) 
0.2941 
(2.4331) 
0.2815  
(2.4037) 
0.6612  
 (2.9234) 
INFt 
-0.0654 
(-2.2672) 
-0.0254 
(-2.3916) 
-0.0177 
(-2.3820) 
-0.0845 
(-2.6114) 
-0.1302 
(-2.2737) 
-0.1826 
(-2.6981) 
-0.1290 
(-2.6823) 
-0.0039 
(-2.3415) 
-0.0732 
(-2.3565) 
-0.1158 
(-2.6918) 
-0.0362 
(-2.8661) 
ΔHKt 
1.6870 
(2.5752) 
0.3892 
(2.3017) 
0.8158 
(2.7403) 
0.8138 
(3.7630) 
0.2472 
(2.2624) 
5.1509  
 (2.5223) 
5.6144 
(2.3645) 
0.1027 
(2.3217) 
0.1784 
(2.3571) 
1.3163 
(2.4351) 
0.6895 
(2.9661) 
ΔOPENt 
0.2489  
 (3.3081)  
0.1118 
(3.2421) 
 0.3014  
(3.4714) 
0.1640 
(2.2765) 
0.3182  
 (3.7715)  
 0.0144 
(2.4131) 
0.1260 
(2.6840) 
0.3682 
(3.1627) 
0.1062 
(3.0817) 
0.0675 
(2.7866 
0.2287 
(2.5232) 
POPGROt 
0.8203 
(2.3159) 
2.0189 
(2.3536) 
3.1168 
(2.8015) 
0.5321 
(2.4667) 
0.2232 
(2.3427) 
2.1177 
(2.8023) 
0.1811 
(2.3661) 
0.8809 
(2.3278) 
1.3868 
(2.6617) 
1.4287 
(2.8617) 
0.9559 
(2.6712) 
GCFt 
0.5195 
(2.5027) 
0.1064 
(3.8523) 
0.1675 
(4.4412) 
0.0735 
(3.1607) 
0.0614 
(2.9812) 
0.4533 
(2.8513) 
0.1202 
(2.4817) 
0.0708 
(2.3615) 
0.7189 
(3.3007) 
0.1318 
(4.3601) 
0.0754 
(2.4551) 
Δdt 
 -0.0974   
(-2.9114) 
-0.1537   
(-2.8486) 
 -0.5210  
(-3.3523) 
 -0.2758  
(-3.5771) 
 -0.2912   
(-2.9441) 
-0.1126 
(-2.5741) 
-0.2249  
(-4.1011) 
-0.1338 
(-2.5261) 
 -0.1721 
(-2.9715) 
 -0.3628 
(-4.1414) 
-0.1332  
(-2.3661) 
 
Notes:  AT, BE, FI, FR, GE, GR, IE, IT, NL, PT and SP stand for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain respectively. 
 In the ordinary brackets below the parameter estimates, the corresponding t-statistics are shown, based on the heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent standard errors proposed by Newey and West (1987). 
 χ2N, χ2SC and χ2H are the Jarque-Bera test for normality, the Breusch-Godfrey LM test for second-order serial correlation and the Breusch-
Pagan-Godfrey test for heteroskedasticity. In the square brackets, the associated probability values are given. 
The marginal effect of public debt changes on real GDP per capita growth ranges from a value of -0.52 
in the case of Finland to one of -0.10 in the case of Austria, suggesting that the impact of government 
debt on economic growth differs clearly across EMU countries. It is noticeable that, on average, the 
marginal impact is higher in central EMU countries (-0.25) than in peripheral ones (-0.19). Therefore, 
although the effect of public debt on economic growth turns out to be high in two peripheral countries 
hit particularly hard by the sovereign debt crisis – Portugal (-0.36) and Ireland (-0.22) – in the other 
three, the marginal effect is still negative but is much lower: -0.13, -0.11 and -0.11 (in Italy, Spain and 
Greece respectively).  
Finally, as can be seen in Panel B in Table 1, the estimated models seem to pass diagnostic tests such as 
normality of error term, second-order residual autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity (χ2N, χ2SC and χ
2
H 
Panel B: Model Diagnostics                        
  AT BE FI FR GE GR IE IT NL PT SP 
Adjusted R2 0.5063 0.5531 0.6626 0.6179 0.6003 0.5734 0.6049 0.6112 0.6573 0.6284 0.6976 
DW Test 2.3305 2.3832 2.4275 2.1767 2.4007 2.3780 2.2491 2.2398 2.2042 2.4135 2.2770 
χ2N  
1.6386 
[0.4408] 
1.6531 
[0.4376] 
1.8337 
[0.3998] 
2.1929 
[0.3341] 
0.0293 
[0.9855] 
3.2498 
[0.1969] 
1.8263 
[0.4013] 
2.4518 
[0.2935] 
1.1960 
[0.5499] 
0.4881 
[0.7843] 
1.1778 
[0.5599] 
χ2SC 
0.7508 
[0.6870] 
0.7374 
[0.6291] 
0.6935 
[0.7070] 
1.7298 
[0.4211] 
0.40403 
[0.7824] 
1.8974 
[0.1620] 
1.2298 
[0.5407] 
3.2015 
[0.2017] 
1.5331 
[0.4646] 
0.4690 
[0.7810] 
3.6623 
[0.1602] 
χ2H 
5.1074 
[0.6469] 
5. 9323 
[0.7457] 
6.6370 
[0.5763] 
5.3963 
[0.6117] 
6.4467 
[0.4887] 
2.6296 
[0.9160] 
9.0999 
[0.2456] 
8.1394 
[0.3205] 
3.8458 
[0.7974] 
3.8772 
[0.7938] 
8.3421 
[0.3034] 
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respectively). The overall regression fit is satisfactory, as measured by the adjusted R2 value (ranging 
from 0.5063 for Austria to 0.6976 for Spain). 
6.3. Exploring the possibility of asymmetric effects  
Here we explore the possibility of an asymmetric effect on positive and negative debt accumulation and 
relief on economic growth for each country. We use the following alternative empirical specification to 
capture this possibility: 
1 1 2 3 4 5
1 2( 0) ( 0)
t t t t t t t
t t t t t
g g INF HK OPEN POPGR GCF
d I d d I d
     
  
       
        
   (4) 
where I is an indicator function that takes the value 1 if Δ td is positive or negative.  
The results reported in Panel A in Table 2 support the existence of an asymmetric effect between debt 
accumulation and debt reduction over growth, since the negative effect of the former (-0.35 on 
average) is, in absolute values, always higher than negative effect of the latter (-0.16 on average). 
However, this asymmetric effect clearly differs between countries. The difference between the two 
marginal impacts ranges from a value of -0.46 in the case of Ireland to one of -0.03 in the case of 
Finland; Ireland, France, Germany, Portugal and Belgium are the countries where the asymmetry is 
higher. Interestingly, we do not find clear differences in patterns between central and peripheral 
countries, since the decrease in the absolute value of the marginal impact in the case of debt reduction 
varies within each group of countries and its average is -0.2 in both cases. Comparing the results of 
Table 2 with those presented in Table 1, we find that when we distinguish between positive and 
negative changes in debt, the absolute value of the negative impact of debt accumulation on growth 
registers a significant increase in three countries: Italy (from 0.13 to 0.45), Ireland (from 0.22 to 0.56) 
and France (from 0.28 to 0.63).  
We conducted diagnostic tests in order to see whether our results are free from the problems of serial 
autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity and non-linearity of residuals. As can be seen in Panel B in Table 2, 
none of these problems existed in our estimates. 
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Table 2:  Asymmetric model estimation results 
Panel A: Estimation results 
  AT BE FI FR GE GR IE IT NL PT SP 
gt-1  
0.3559  
 (3.0788) 
0.1870 
(2.5262) 
 0.1073  
 (2.8123) 
0.3912  
(3.5921) 
0.0742  
 (2.5679) 
0.3480 
(2.7614)  
0.2401  
(2.4153) 
0.3559   
(3.0331) 
0.2898 
(2.3412) 
0.2708  
(2.3516) 
0.6603  
 (3.0222) 
INFt 
-0.0652 
(-2.9961) 
-0.0106 
(-2.4834) 
-0.0161 
(-2.3312) 
-0.0688 
(-2.3550) 
-0.1253 
(-2.2652) 
-0.1799 
(-2.6431) 
-0.1262 
(-2.8015) 
-0.0359 
(-2.3328) 
-0.0777 
(-2.4357) 
-0.1074 
(-2.5315) 
-0.0386 
(-2.8881) 
ΔHKt 
1.6174 
(2.3552) 
0.3891 
(2.4215) 
0.8188 
(2.7420) 
0.8502 
(3.8110) 
0.5722 
(2.3291) 
6.0990  
 (2.3261) 
3.1679 
(2.3716) 
0.3697 
(2.4171) 
0.1124 
(2.3232) 
1.3625 
(2.4571) 
0.7463 
(2.8221) 
ΔOPENt 
0.2495  
 (3.2762)  
0.1166 
(3.4623) 
 0.3001  
(3.3361) 
0.1827 
(2.4207) 
0.3193  
 (3.9825)  
 0.0679 
(2.4801 
0.0347 
(2.6916) 
0.3259 
(2.8812) 
0.0998 
(2.8415) 
0.0652 
(2.7661) 
0.2256 
(2.4551) 
POPGROt 
0.8097 
(2.3115) 
2.2881 
(2.5923) 
3.1118 
(2.7812) 
0.5730 
(2.5134) 
0.3691 
(2.6681) 
1.5568 
(2.3341) 
0.1370 
(2.3527) 
1.3890 
(2.3862) 
1.2397 
(2.3281) 
1.4770 
(2.9188) 
0.9190 
(2.5662) 
GCFt 
0.5343 
(2.4962) 
0.1312 
(3.8324) 
0.1661 
(4.1012) 
0.0564 
(3.2123) 
0.0755 
(2.4618) 
0.4923 
(2.3516) 
0.2046 
(2.8801) 
0.1319 
(3.1715) 
0.7081 
(3.2661) 
0.1396 
(4.2320) 
0.0810 
(2.4617) 
ΔdtI(Δdt>0) 
-0.1457 
(-2.5634) 
-0.2408 
(-2.6921) 
-0.5437 
(-4.5723) 
-0.6297 
(-2.5815) 
-0.4169 
(-3.3752) 
-0.1010 
(-2.5171) 
-0.5607 
(-4.7312) 
-0.4481 
(-2.7143) 
-0.2516 
(-2.6661) 
-0.3996 
(-3.7512) 
-0.1507 
(-2.5810) 
ΔdtI(Δdt<0) 
-0.0864 
(-2.3998) 
-0.0309 
(-2.3042) 
-0.5154 
(-2.2314) 
-0.1813 
(-2.3551) 
-0.0772 
(-2.3684) 
-0.0533 
(-2.5215) 
-0.1018 
(-2.6017) 
-0.3263 
(-2.6551) 
-0.1249 
(-2.4345) 
-0.1847 
(-2.6222) 
-0.0456 
(-2.3516) 
 
 Panel B: Model Diagnostics                        
  AT BE FI FR GE GR IE IT NL PT SP 
Adjusted R2 0.5066 0.5699 0.6628 0.6362 0.6311 0.5993 0.6759 0.6516 0.6714 0.6315 0.6991 
DW Test 2.3432 2.3579 2.4382 2.2609 2.4112 2.3516 2.2541 2.2603 2.2412 2.4211 2.3722 
χ2N  
1.8019 
[0.4062] 
2.6446 
[0.2663] 
3.1147 
[0.2107] 
1.5031 
[0.4717] 
0.3633 
[0.8339] 
3.2498 
[0.1969] 
1.6654 
[0.4349] 
1.6246 
[0.4438] 
1.2961 
[0.5231] 
0.4881 
[0.7843] 
1.1778 
[0.5599] 
χ2SC 
0.7221 
[0.6972] 
0.6737 
[0.5991] 
0.6935 
[0.7070] 
2.3360 
[0.3110] 
0.4703 
[0.8231] 
0.5918 
[0.7439] 
0.7039 
[0.7033] 
3.2015 
[0.2017] 
1.9344 
[0.3802] 
0.3406 
[0.8434] 
3.4576 
[0.1775] 
χ2H 
9.7357 
[0.2841] 
6.7833 
[0.7457] 
6.6370 
[0.5763] 
5.3963 
[0.6117] 
6.4655 
[0.4973] 
2.6931 
[0.9521] 
8.7579 
[0.2707] 
7.3818 
[0.4961] 
10.3646 
[0.2404] 
4.8097 
[0.7777] 
10.5802 
[0.2266] 
  
Notes:  AT, BE, FI, FR, GE, GR, IE, IT, NL, PT and SP stand for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain respectively. 
 In the ordinary brackets below the parameter estimates, the corresponding t-statistics are shown, based on the heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent standard errors proposed by Newey and West (1987). 
 χ2N, χ2SC and χ2H are the Jarque-Bera test for normality, the Breusch-Godfrey LM test for second-order serial correlation and the Breusch-
Pagan-Godfrey test for heteroskedasticity. In the square brackets, the associated probability values are given. 
 
Lastly, if we focus on the marginal impact of a debt reduction over growth in peripheral countries − 
where some countries (Portugal, Ireland and Greece) received financial rescue packages conditional on 
fiscal austerity and the implementation of structural reforms, and others (Spain) received financial 
assistance to recapitalize its banks with conditions on implementing structural reforms – we see that, 
precisely in these four countries, this impact presents very low values (-0.18, -0.10, -0.05 and -0.05 in 
Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain, respectively) highlighting that the effect of austerity policies for 
boosting economy in those countries is limited.  
These results are in accordance with most of the recent literature which has studied whether the 
consolidation of public finances in the euro area through the reduction of fiscal expenditures and an 
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increase in taxes contributed to GDP growth. Dreiger and Reimers (2016) point out that the lack of 
public investment may have restricted private investment and thus GDP growth. Fatás and Summers 
(2016) provide support for the presence of strong hysteresis effects of fiscal policy, suggesting that 
attempts to reduce debt via fiscal consolidations have very likely resulted in a higher debt-to-GDP ratio 
through their long-term negative impact on output. Jordà and Taylor (2016)’s estimates indicate that in 
a slump austerity generally prolongs the pain, much more so than in a boom.  
Some of the literature has focused its analysis on the peripheral countries hit harder by the crisis. Aldici 
et al. (2016) look at the feasibility of the fiscal adjustment comparing the macroeconomic conditions in 
each country and emphasizing the role of the fiscal multipliers in the process. Their results also point to 
the slump in investment as the key negative factor behind the collapse in demand in all cases. 
Moreover, they suggest that one of the reasons why the recession was particularly deep in Greece was 
that the fall in investment was not even partially offset by higher exports, in contrast to Portugal and 
Ireland. Anderson et al. (2014) contend that structural reforms in core countries could be expected to 
offset the near-term negative impact on activity arising from the required fiscal consolidation. However, 
for the periphery, their results suggest that it would take several years before structural reforms could 
return the level of output to its pre-consolidation path. Inspecting the adjustment programs in place 
during the past few years in Portugal, Reis (2015) concludes that if success is assessed as making 
another debt crisis unlikely in the near future, the program delivered; however, if instead it is judged in 
terms of a rebound of the economy from its prolonged depression, then there is little to celebrate. 
Finally, Rosnick and Weisbrot (2015), who focus on the Spanish economy, find that the data do not 
support the thesis that the current economic recovery is the result of a return of market, consumer, and 
investor confidence due to fiscal consolidation; for them, a more likely explanation is a slowdown and 
possibly even the end of fiscal consolidation, combined with more favourable external factors. These 
authors corroborate our results that fiscal consolidation in Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain barely 
affected economic recovery. 
 
6.4. Identifying threshold effects  
Identifying a threshold effect for each economy under study would inform policy makers of the 
presence of a country-specific tipping point, which would be useful information for guiding 
macroeconomic policies and fiscal adjustments. To this end, we use the following alternative 
specification: 
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1 1 2 3 4 5
* *
1 2( ) ( )
t t t t t t t t
t t t t t
g g g INF HK OPEN POPGR GCF
d I d d d I d d
     
  
        
      
   (5) 
where I is an indicator function that takes the value 1 if 
td  is either below or above a specific threshold 
value *.d  Therefore, following the common practice in the empirical literature, the assignment to one 
or the other regime is determined by the debt-to-GDP ratio, allowing us to compare our results with 
previous papers which have adopted this ratio as the primary variable of interest. We evaluate all 
possible values for *,d selecting for each country the value that minimizes the sum of squared residuals 
from the regression as the relevant one. 
Table 3:  Threshold model estimation results 
Panel A: Estimation results 
  AT BE FI FR GE GR IE IT NL PT SP 
gt-1  
0.3648 
 (3.1862) 
0.0907 
(2.8003) 
 0.0932  
 (2.7241) 
0.3842  
(3.7111) 
0.0942  
 (2.7181) 
0.4042 
(3.2924)  
0.3397  
(2.7037) 
0.3736  
(3.2115) 
0.3436 
(2.8661) 
0.2879  
(2.4514) 
0.6492  
 (3.1016) 
INFt 
-0.0610 
(-2.9272) 
-0.0161 
(-2.2725) 
-0.0278 
(-2.6015) 
-0.0647 
(-2.3243) 
-0.1662 
(-2.6891) 
-0.1635 
(-2.5342) 
-0.1133 
(-2.4715) 
-0.0043 
(-2.3451) 
-0.0380 
(-2.6655) 
-0.0774 
(-2.3771) 
-0.0434 
(-2.3561) 
ΔHKt 
1.7884 
(2.6473) 
0.1510 
(2.3815) 
1.0678 
(2.9711) 
1.3752 
(2.3371) 
1.4776 
(2.8560) 
4.5210  
 (2.7027) 
6.2846 
(3.1442) 
0.5810 
(2.6261) 
0.2169 
(2.3241) 
1.3216 
(2.4241) 
0.7288 
(2.3230) 
ΔOPENt 
0.2392  
 (3.1217)  
0.0981 
(3.1434) 
 0.2838  
(4.1922) 
0.1658 
(2.3548) 
0.2855  
 (3.6808)  
 0.0560 
(2.4128) 
0.1218 
(2.6525) 
0.3615 
(3.2331) 
0.1057 
(3.0910) 
0.1006 
(2.3346) 
0.2405 
(2.6919) 
POPGROt 
0.8572 
(2.3587) 
2.5998 
(3.1942) 
2.6089 
(2.5020) 
1.9275 
(2.6321) 
0.3057 
(2.4766) 
1.7582 
(2.5006) 
0.2476 
(2.5771) 
1.2511 
(2.5927) 
1.4051 
(2.7316) 
1.9496 
(2.8416) 
0.8891 
(2.5802 
GCFt 
0.6005 
(2.6678) 
0.1198 
(4.6411) 
0.1600 
(4.2623) 
0.0512 
(2.3243) 
0.0549 
(2.8793) 
0.4746 
(2.3616) 
0.0911 
(2.37110) 
0.0843 
(2.6116) 
0.6847 
(3.1671) 
0.1278 
(4.2111) 
0.0790 
(2.6234) 
ΔdtI(dt>d*) 
-0.1778 
(-2.7815) 
-0.7263 
(-3.7814) 
-0.7716 
(-5.0371) 
-1.0077 
(-3.6276) 
-0.6148 
(-3.6115) 
-0.1502 
(-2.9015) 
-0.3130 
(-3.1051) 
-0.1786 
(-2.7912) 
-2.6985 
(-2.8334) 
-0.3773 
(-4.2510) 
-0.1879 
(-2.7711) 
ΔdtI(dt<d*) 
0.0579 
(2.7145) 
0.1256 
(2.4920) 
0.4932 
(3.9631) 
0.1714 
(2.4142) 
0.1959 
(2.8436) 
0.4061 
(2.8771) 
0.2130 
(3.8233) 
0.0648 
(2.6818) 
0.1647 
(2.5671) 
0.0485 
(2.3516) 
0.0211 
(2.2414) 
d* 
 
28% 
[1977] 
61% 
[1970] 
40% 
[1992] 
21% 
[1978] 
55% 
[1995] 
59% 
[1989] 
50% 
[1976] 
41% 
[1971] 
38% 
[1974] 
37% 
[1981] 
52% 
[1993] 
Panel B: Model Diagnostics                        
  AT BE FI FR GE GR IE IT NL PT SP 
Adjusted R2 0.5066 0.5644 0.6778 0.6706 0.6541 0.6021 0.6954 0.6567 0.6759 0.6379 0.7168 
DW Test 2.3432 2.3426 2.4117 2.2476 2.4415 2.3853 2.2678 2.2655 2.2541 2.4083 2.3421 
χ2N  
1.68281 
[0.4311] 
0.7051 
[0.6720] 
1.4800 
[0.4771] 
2.8600 
[0.2393] 
0.0537 
[0.9735] 
3.1281 
[0.1969] 
1.3685 
[0.5045] 
0.9928 
[0.6215] 
0.7728 
[0.6795] 
0.4881 
[0.7843] 
1.1778 
[0.5599] 
χ2SC 
1.8910 
[0.3885] 
2.5622 
[0.2777] 
0.6935 
[0.7070] 
1.0346 
[0.5961] 
0.4403 
[0.8024] 
0.8994 
[0.6378] 
0.5570 
[0.7569] 
3.1207 
[0.2101] 
2.8994 
[0.2353] 
0.2147 
[0.8982] 
4.1838 
[0.1235] 
χ2H 
4.6661 
[0.7926] 
6.7833 
[0.7457] 
8.9735 
[0.3445] 
5.3963 
[0.6117] 
9.0188 
[0.3407] 
6.3616 
[0.6068] 
9.0652 
[0.3368] 
11.3425 
[0.1830] 
12.1291 
[0.1455] 
5.0279 
[0.7546] 
8.5501 
[0.3817] 
 
Notes:  AT, BE, FI, FR, GE, GR, IE, IT, NL, PT and SP stand for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain respectively. 
 d* indicates the estimated threshold in the debt/GDP ratio and, in the square brackets below them, we present the year when the  
threshold is reached.   
 In the ordinary brackets below the parameter estimates, the corresponding t-statistics are shown, based on the heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent standard errors proposed by Newey and West (1987). 
 χ2N, χ2SC and χ2H are the Jarque-Bera test for normality, the Breusch-Godfrey LM test for second-order serial correlation and the Breusch-
Pagan-Godfrey test for heteroskedasticity. In the square brackets, the associated probability values are given. 
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The results in Panel A in Table 3 show the debt-to-GDP threshold beyond which a debt increase starts 
to be detrimental for growth. It is striking that we do not find a common debt threshold in the EMU 
countries under study: it differs notably from country to country, ranging from 61% in Belgium to 21% 
in France. Furthermore, with the exceptions of Belgium (61%) and Germany (55%), the average value 
of the debt threshold is higher in peripheral (48%) than in central countries (41%). However, the 
average negative marginal impact of a debt increase beyond that point on growth is much higher in 
central (-0.999) than in peripheral countries (-0.241). Therefore, these results suggest that with the 
exceptions of Belgium and Germany, central countries have a little more room to increase their public 
indebtedness than peripheral ones before it starts to have a detrimental effect on growth. Nevertheless, 
beyond the tipping point the harmful effect of a debt increase on economic performance is much 
higher in central than in peripheral countries; this may explain “the debt intolerance” exhibited by some 
core EMU countries14.  
All in all, the average threshold (44%) for the eleven countries under study is much lower than the 
figure obtained in the literature for euro area countries by means of panel data techniques. Checherita-
Westphal and Rother (2012) find that, between 1970 and 2008, the turning point was 90-100% of 
GDP, while Baum et al. (2013), who focused on the 1990-2010 period, detected a similar threshold 
(95%) using a dynamic approach. The different results should be assessed with due caution and should 
be examined in the context of the distinct methodological approach implemented in this paper, since 
we adopt a times series analysis instead of a panel data approach and we deal appropriately with the 
different order of integration of the relevant variables, using changes in debt-to-GDP ratio as the 
primary variable of interest.   
However, in our view, our results are much more consistent than the ones just mentioned with the 
Stability and Growth Pact’s (SGP)15 debt ceiling of 60% of GDP. Otherwise, if the tipping point 
(beyond which government debt negatively affects growth) was 90-100% of GDP, what would be the 
justification for requiring governments, under penalty of fines, to reduce their debt ratios if they 
surpassed the 60% reference value? Still, the accuracy of the fiscal limits included in the SGP has been 
surrounded by considerable controversy in the literature, and there is no agreement on its efficiency.  
                                                          
14 As can be seen in Panel B in Table 3, the regressions fit reasonably well, as they pass the diagnostic tests against non-normal errors, 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity.   
15 The revised Stability and Growth Pact (European Economy, 2011) includes the clause that if the fiscal position falls short of the 
Medium-Term Objectives (MTOs), countries must implement more ambitious adjustment plans in order to meet them. In addition, for 
countries with debt ratios above 60% of GDP, an excessive deficit procedure can be launched if the debt ratio is deemed not to be 
decreasing at a satisfactory rate – meaning that the debt ratio must diminish annually by at least 1/20th of the difference between the 
actual debt ratio and 60% of GDP reference value. 
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In an empirical study of whether it pays off (in terms of economic growth) to fulfil the convergence 
criteria on the public budget and participation in the euro area, Bökemeier and Clemens (2016)’s results 
show that growth is higher if the debt-to-GDP ratio is below 60%. Similarly, Checherita-Westphal et al. 
(2014) estimate that euro area governments should maintain a debt-to-GDP target of 50% if they wish 
to maximize growth. However, other authors consider that a profound reform of the SGP is needed to 
make it work in the future. Ioannou and Stracca (2014) present evidence that the SGP has had no 
significant beneficial impact on the fiscal and economic performance of euro area countries; while 
Teulings (2016) shows that an episode of increased dynamic inefficiency, like the one driven by the 
Great Recession and the increased financial volatility, would require a higher debt level than those 
considered in the SGP. 
In this context, the conclusions that can be drawn from our analysis at this point are also mixed. On 
the one hand, in all the countries under study but Belgium, a debt increase begins to have detrimental 
effects on growth well before the SGP debt ceiling, meaning that fiscal policies should stay within a 
safe zone (i.e., a debt ratio of around 50% and 40% in peripheral and central countries respectively) 
below the official fiscal limit. So, with average debt levels of 100% in euro area countries, deleverage 
(austerity policies) should be applied; but, according to our results, debt reduction exerts barely any 
significant beneficial impact on euro area countries’ economic performance. Therefore, in our view, 
adjustment programmes should be accompanied by structural reforms that might increase the 
adjustment capacity or the potential GDP in euro area countries (see Aldici et. al. 2016). Otherwise, 
after years of experience with fiscal austerity which have reaffirmed its ineffectiveness as a primary 
instrument of debt reduction, according to other authors (see Mody (2013), among them) the current 
policy dilemmas might only be solved in a framework that allows orderly debt restructuring. 
Finally, it is interesting to note that in eight out of the 11 countries in our sample (Austria, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain), the years when the detected thresholds ratios 
are recorded coincide with the minimum value of the index of the fiscal stance proposed by Polito and 
Wickens (2012, 2014). This suggests that after a severe worsening of fiscal policy, an additional increase 
in the debt-to-GDP ratio would not stimulate economic growth. This reading is consistent with the 
claim made in Polito and Wickens (2012) that the main causes of fluctuations in their index are 
fluctuations in the gap between expenditures and revenues. 
6.5. Comparing results  
In order to compare the results obtained from the three models (the basic model, the asymmetric 
model and the threshold model), we perform stochastic dynamic simulations of the estimated models 
to assess how each explanatory variable contributes to the explanation of the average growth rate of 
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real per capita GDP during the 1981-2015 period.  Table 4 reports the results for each country under 
study16. 
Table 4: Contribution of each explanatory variable to the growth rate 
  AT BE FI FR GE GR IE IT NL PT SP 
        Basic model 
   gt-1 
INFt  
ΔHKt  
ΔOPENt  
POPGROt 
GCFt 
Δdt 
 
Explained 
 
0.0035 
-0.0010 
1.5545 
0.0084 
0.0173 
0.5522 
-0.0064 
 
2.1285 
 
0.2320 
-0.0659 
0.0456 
0.1229 
0.4737 
1.5458 
-0.0745 
 
2.2796 
 
0.1109 
-0.0359 
0.0792 
0.1051 
0.9316 
1.5851 
-0.2708 
 
2.5052 
 
0.7693 
-0.2873 
0.1584 
0.0952 
0.2869 
1.4539 
-0.3114 
 
2.1649 
 
0.1592 
-1.0342 
0.0971 
0.6555 
0.0989 
2.6688 
-0.5370 
 
2.1073 
 
0.1372 
-0.1214 
0.1960 
0.0016 
0.2232 
1.7531 
-0.0249 
 
2.1694 
 
0.6697 
-0.3471 
0.8767 
0.1659 
0.0986 
1.5449 
-0.0786 
 
2.9302 
 
0.6633 
-0.0135 
0.0181 
0.1759 
0.2475 
1.1776 
-0.1988 
 
2.0702 
 
0.0650 
-0.0373 
0.0027 
0.0164 
0.1048 
1.7883 
-0.0010 
 
1.9390 
 
0.6537 
-0.4039 
0.3305 
0.0453 
0.3216 
2.5952 
-0.5920 
 
2.9504 
 
1.0169 
-0.1090 
0.0993 
0.1183 
0.4240 
1.0584 
-0.1027 
 
2.5052 
         Asymmetric model 
   gt-1 
INFt  
ΔHKt  
ΔOPENt  
POPGROt 
GCFt 
           ΔdtI(Δdt>0) 
          ΔdtI(Δdt<0) 
      
      Explained 
 
0.0035 
-0.0011 
1.5333 
0.0086 
0.0176 
0.5843 
-0.0096 
0.0014 
 
2.1381 
 
0.2399 
-0.0246 
0.0416 
0.1106 
0.4775 
1.6940 
-0.2950 
0.0245 
 
2.2719 
 
0.1129 
-0.0332 
0.0806 
0.1062 
0.9439 
1.5953 
-0.5096 
0.2112 
 
2.5076 
 
1.2232 
-0.3844 
0.2718 
0.1742 
0.8494 
1.8341 
-1.5845 
0.1200 
 
2.1618 
 
0.2347 
-0.8189 
0.1847 
0.5397 
0.1343 
2.6980 
-0.9452 
0.0581 
 
2.0855 
 
0.1222 
-0.1128 
0.2189 
0.0073 
0.1548 
1.7960 
-0.0285 
0.0040 
 
2.1618 
 
0.6245 
-0.4432 
0.6457 
0.0596 
0.0974 
3.4339 
-1.4156 
0.2105 
 
3.2127 
 
0.4581 
-0.1006 
0.0526 
0.1259 
0.3155 
1.7745 
-0.6881 
0.1089 
 
2.0469 
 
0.0625 
-0.0415 
0.0018 
0.0162 
0.0981 
1.8440 
-0.0354 
0.0136 
 
1.9592 
 
0.6235 
-0.3715 
0.3393 
0.0434 
0.3296 
2.7276 
-0.8352 
0.0874 
 
2.9446 
 
1.0230 
-0.1170 
0.1083 
0.1176 
0.4106 
1.1452 
-0.2081 
0.0276 
 
2.5073 
Thres   Threshold model 
   gt-1 
INFt  
ΔHKt  
ΔOPENt  
POPGROt 
GCFt 
           ΔdtI(dt>d*) 
          ΔdtI(dt<d*) 
   
        Explained 
 
0.0031 
-0.0009 
1.5115 
0.0081 
0.0166 
0.5854 
-0.0078 
0.0001 
 
2.1161 
 
0.1378 
-0.0439 
0.0186 
0.1478 
0.6423 
1.8311 
-0.4870 
0.0204 
 
2.2672 
 
0.1127 
-0.0658 
0.1209 
0.1394 
0.9098 
1.7664 
-0.4548 
0.0084 
 
2.5370 
 
0.9677 
-0.2909 
0.3542 
0.1663 
1.3747 
1.3390 
-1.8071 
0.0513 
 
2.1552 
 
0.2972 
-1.0823 
0.4753 
0.6249 
0.1109 
1.9550 
-0.4277 
0.1595 
 
2.1127 
 
0.1464 
-0.1057 
0.1674 
0.0021 
0.1803 
1.7861 
-0.0387 
0.0175 
 
2.1552 
 
0.7712 
-0.3473 
1.1182 
0.1189 
0.1536 
1.3341 
-0.1528 
0.0191 
 
3.0151 
 
0.5187 
-0.0131 
0.0892 
0.1685 
0.3064 
1.2224 
-0.2160 
0.0056 
 
2.0817 
 
0.0790 
-0.0201 
0.0034 
0.0162 
0.1105 
1.7711 
-0.0220 
0.0003 
 
1.9385 
 
0.6201 
-0.2504 
0.3077 
0.0650 
0.4070 
2.3344 
-0.5263 
0.0057 
 
2.9631 
 
1.0296 
-0.1347 
0.1082 
0.1284 
0.4067 
1.1437 
-0.1453 
0.0005 
 
2.5370 
 
 
Observed 
 
2.3619 
 
2.2357 
 
2.5387 
 
2.1517 
 
2.0488 
 
2.1517 
 
3.7567 
 
1.9941 
 
2.0417 
 
2.9489 
 
2.5387 
 
Notes:  AT, BE, FI, FR, GE, GR, IE, IT, NL, PT and SP stand for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain respectively. 
 
As can be seen, that the absolute value of the average negative contribution of a debt increase to 
growth is lower in the basic (-0.2) than in the asymmetric or the threshold model, but quite similar in 
the two latter models (-0.6 in the asymmetric model and -0.4 in the threshold). Moreover, whilst in the 
case of the asymmetric model the average negative contribution does not differ between central and 
peripheral countries, in the threshold model the contribution is higher in central countries (-0.5) than in 
peripheral ones (-0.2).    
To compare the three models further, we perform dynamic multi-step forecasts of gt. within the sample 
using previously forecasted values of gt, and evaluate these forecasts based upon the model with the 
actual data. Table 5 shows the forecasting performance of our competing models. We evaluated their 
                                                          
16 To save space, we only comment on the results for variations in the debt-to-GDP ratio.   
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forecasting performance using five different measures of forecast accuracy: the Root Mean Squared 
Error (RMSE), the Mean Absolute Error (MAE), the Mean Absolute Percentage Error (MAPE), and 
two Theil Inequality coefficients (U1 for forecast accuracy and U2 for forecast quality). These statistics 
all provide a measure of the distance of the true from the forecasted values. 
Table 5: Forecast accuracy 
  AT BE FI FR GE GR IE IT NL PT SP 
Basic model 
 
RMSE 
MAE 
MAPE 
SMAPE 
Theil´s U1 
Theil´s U2 
 
 
1.6848 
1.2768 
245.0121 
69.0947 
0.3022 
0.4106 
 
1.5279 
1.2548 
114.7193 
65.6566 
0.2735 
0.3443 
 
1.7840 
1.4323 
230.0805 
60.8934 
0.2723 
0.5745 
 
1.3709 
1.1448 
126.3652 
66.1737 
0.2552 
0.8424 
 
1.4277 
1.1337 
146.4504 
67.5827 
0.2642 
0.9060 
 
3.4920 
2.7993 
223.6661 
93.4142 
0.4225 
0.8772 
 
2.4578 
1.8990 
107.6816 
63.5401 
0.2308 
0.3198 
 
2.2184 
1.8534 
230.9430 
88.2645 
0.3854 
0.4814 
 
1.3850 
1.1171 
64.2640 
68.5049 
0.2623 
0.5553 
 
2.3899 
1.9305 
191.4446 
72.7991 
0.2749 
0.5815 
 
1.9948 
1.5531 
95.0091 
75.8978 
0.2974 
0.4888 
         Asymmetric model 
 
RMSE 
MAE 
MAPE 
SMAPE 
Theil´s U1 
Theil´s U2 
 
 
 
1.6822 
1.2728 
245.7643 
68.9455 
0.3014 
0.4092 
 
 
1.4986 
1.1977 
107.4667 
64.2291 
0.2680 
0.3261 
 
 
1.7829 
1.4308 
228.8803 
60.9822 
0.2322 
0.5765 
 
 
1.3404 
1.1123 
118.2404 
65.9260 
0.2476 
0.8058 
 
 
1.3729 
1.0684 
128.8657 
64.9815 
0.2526 
0.6856 
 
 
3.4865 
2.7963 
224.1046 
93.0946 
0.4214 
0.8778 
 
 
2.1692 
1.6385 
80.2761 
66.1567 
0.1950 
0.2470 
 
 
1.9725 
1.6361 
183.8302 
82.3025 
0.3397 
0.2457 
 
 
1.3721 
1.1049 
63.3426 
68.3219 
0.2584 
0.5860 
 
 
2.3637 
1.9034 
194.9332 
71.5568 
0.2714 
0.5292 
 
 
1.9586 
1.5217 
98.0630 
75.5680 
0.2922 
0.5312 
         Threshold model 
 
RMSE 
MAE 
MAPE 
SMAPE 
Theil´s U1 
Theil´s U2 
 
 
 
1.6200 
1.2728 
230.4791 
68.8439 
0.2902 
0.4173 
 
 
1.3665 
1.1073 
99.9720 
59.4496 
0.2412 
0.4069 
 
 
1.7433 
1.4181 
223.1427 
62.5958 
0.2267 
0.6653 
 
 
1.2398 
1.0766 
105.3032 
64.3054 
0.2781 
0.7535 
 
 
1.3362 
1.0949 
130.1500 
61.8427 
0.2486 
0.8544 
 
 
3.4447 
2.7419 
225.9949 
93.2006 
0.4069 
0.8874 
 
 
2.4209 
1.8972 
105.2398 
65.4133 
0.2227 
0.3176 
 
 
1.9903 
1.6848 
225.3614 
81.6343 
0.3406 
0.6981 
 
 
1.3946 
1.1149 
63.8774 
68.9971 
0.2637 
0.5574 
 
 
2.3177 
1.8525 
178.5043 
71.3297 
0.2657 
0.4095 
 
 
1.8668 
1.4687 
92.1965 
65.3488 
0.2759 
0.4471 
 
 
Notes:  AT, BE, FI, FR, GE, GR, IE, IT, NL, PT and SP stand for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain respectively. 
 RMSE is the Root Mean Square Error, MAE is the Mean Absolute Error, MAPE is the Mean Absolute Percentage Error, Theil’s U1 is 
the Theil Inequality coefficient of forecast accuracy, and Theil’s U2 is the Theil Inequality coefficient of forecast quality. Bold values 
indicate the forecast that performed the best under each of the evaluation statistics 
 
The results presented in Table 5 indicate that in most of the countries the threshold model reports 
higher forecast accuracy. The exceptions are Italy, Ireland and the Netherlands, where the asymmetric 
model presents better forecast quality jointly with Germany, where both the threshold and the 
asymmetric model seem to be just as good. 
Therefore, when analysing the contribution of a debt increase in economic growth (Table 4), we will 
rely on the results obtained from the threshold model in the case of Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Greece, Portugal and Spain; while in Italy, Ireland and the Netherlands, we will use the results from the 
asymmetric model. In the case of Germany, we will take both into account. Since in Germany the 
average negative contribution of a debt increase to growth is much higher in the asymmetric (-0.95) 
than in the threshold model (-0.43), depending on which value is used in the case of this country the 
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average negative contribution of a debt increase in euro area countries on economic performance 
ranges from -0.60 to -0.55, although we do not find any significant differences in the average values 
between central and peripheral countries.  
However, focusing on the behaviour of the contribution of a debt increase to economic growth within 
each group of countries (central and peripheral), we do find important differences. France, Germany, 
Belgium and Finland are the central countries with the highest negative contribution of a debt increase 
(its values range from -1.81 to -0.45 or -0.43 – in the case of Germany, depending on the model used), 
while the Netherlands and Austria have the lowest (-0.04 and -0.01 respectively). In the case of 
peripheral countries, Ireland, Italy and Portugal are the ones with the highest negative contributions (-
1.42, -0.69 and -0.53), while in Spain and Greece it is significantly lower (-0.15 and -0.04 respectively).  
Even though we agree that it is imperative to lower public debt over time, these results, combined with 
those displayed in Table 3, reinforce the idea that European policymakers need to be aware that the 
effect of debt on economic performance differs according to EMU country, as does the effect of fiscal 
adjustments on growth prospects. Therefore, we think that the pace of adjustment should differ 
between countries. In particular, according to our results, the five peripheral countries under study 
should be split in three groups with regard to the implementation of policy measures. The first would 
include Spain and Greece, the second Italy and Portugal, and Ireland would be the sole member of the 
third.  
In Spain and Greece, not only is the debt threshold above 50% (close to 60% in the Greek case), but 
the negative contribution of debt to economic growth is also very low. In Italy and Portugal public debt 
reaches its tipping point at a lower value (close to 40%) and the negative contribution of sovereign 
indebtedness to economic performance is more significant (with an average value of -0.61). Finally, in 
Ireland the debt threshold is 50%, but the negative contribution of a debt increase is very high (-1.42).   
Consequently, in the Greek and Spanish cases (whose economies have been severely hit by the crisis), 
our findings suggest that the pace of fiscal adjustment should be lower than in the other three 
countries. In Ireland, the country with the highest detrimental effect of sovereign debt increase on 
growth, a faster fiscal adjustment should be applied. Besides, in order to support growth when fiscal 
policy is tightened, we also agree that there is a need for reforms in goods, service, and labour markets 
to improve economic efficiency and boost potential growth, thus serving as important tools in the fiscal 
adjustment process. Policies enhancing both stability and growth are possible in the EMU; some of 
them have already been implemented, and others are at an advanced stage of development. 
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7. Concluding remarks 
In this paper we propose a new approach to analyse the debt-growth nexus, a relationship which has 
spawned a multitude of studies using a wide range of methodologies and conclusions. The previous 
work rests largely on the results from panel data studies, but we argue that more can be learned from 
appropriate time series analyses for individual countries in order to record their heterogeneous 
experiences. In doing so, we do not discount the importance of the panel data approach, which has 
some relevant theoretical implications; rather, we question the way in which these results are presented, 
and indeed the way in which they are used by policymakers. 
Therefore, this paper builds upon the existing literature studying the effect of public debt-to-GDP ratio 
on economic growth, focusing on the time series dimension of the issue to obtain further evidence 
based on the historical experience of 11 EMU member countries during the 1961-2015 period to detect 
potential heterogeneities in the relationship across the euro area. As in every empirical analysis, the 
results must be treated with some caution since they are based on a set of countries over a certain 
period and on a given econometric methodology. This is particularly true of the comparison of the 
results with those of previous papers, since we adopt a time series analysis instead of a panel data 
approach, and since we use changes in debt-to-GDP ratio as the primary variable of interest instead of 
the level of debt-to-GDP ratio.   
The results presented in this paper should be of value to macro-prudential policymakers, as they 
provide evidence that in all the countries under study (with the exception of Belgium) a debt increase 
begins to have detrimental effects on growth well before the SGP debt ceiling is reached, meaning that 
fiscal policies should stay within a safe zone (a debt ratio around 40% and 50% in central and 
peripheral countries respectively) below the official fiscal limit. So, with average debt levels of 100% in 
euro area countries, deleverage (austerity policies) should be applied, but according to our results debt 
reduction does not exert any significant benefit on euro area countries’ economic performance. 
Therefore, in our view, adjustment programmes should be accompanied by structural reforms able to 
increase the adjustment capacity or the potential GDP in euro area countries. Otherwise, the current 
policy dilemmas might only be solved (see Mody, 2013) in a framework that allows orderly debt 
restructuring.  
Moreover, since our results provide support for the idea that the harmful impact of debt on growth 
does not occur beyond the same debt ratio threshold and with the same intensity in all EMU countries, 
a focus on average ratios and impacts may be misleading for the definition of policy in individual 
countries. This is especially true in an environment in which some EMU countries must already apply 
adjustment plans that re-establish competitiveness and fiscal balance. Specifically, our findings suggest 
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that the pace of fiscal adjustment should be lower in Greece and Spain than in the other three 
peripheral countries. 
Finally, our findings may also provide useful data for economic theoreticians since, as Coase (1988, 71) 
states “the inspiration is most likely to come through the stimulus provided by the patterns, puzzles and 
anomalies revealed by the systematic gathering of data, particularly when the prime need is to break our 
existing habits of thought”. 
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Appendix 1: Definition of the explanatory variables and data sources 
 
 
 
Variable Description Source 
Real growth rate (gt) Growth rate of real per capita GDP (annual %)   World Development Indicators (World Bank), 
extended to 2015 using  World Economic 
Outlook, October 2016 (IMF) 
Level of Output (yt) Per capita Gross domestic product at 2010 market prices AMECO, extended to 2015 using  World 
Economic Outlook, October 2016 (IMF) 
Public debt-to-GDP ratio (dt) Ratio of public debt to GDP AMECO and International Monetary Fund 
Population growth (POPGRt) Population growth (annual %) World Development Indicators (World Bank),  
extended to 2015 using World Economic 
Outlook, October 2016 (IMF) 
GCF-to-GDP ratio (GCFt) Ratio of gross capital formation to GDP World Development Indicators (World Bank) 
Human capital (HKt) Life expectancy at birth, total (years) World Development Indicators (World Bank) 
Openness (OPENt) Absolute sum of exports and imports over GDP World Development Indicators (World Bank),  
extended to 2015 using  World Economic 
Outlook, October 2016 (IMF) 
Inflation (INFt) Growth rate of GDP deflator (annual %) World Development Indicators (World Bank),  
extended to 2015 using  World Economic 
Outlook, October 2016 (IMF) 
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